Like many atheist objections, it applies equally as well against atheism…or I should say it applies against atheism and is solved by Christianity. Here’s why, I could say “is something wrong because you atheist say it’s wrong? (Arbitrary) Or do you say it’s wrong because it’s wrong? (So what’s the basis of the standard?)”
I think you're missing something crucial here. If "it's wrong because it's wrong" then that means moral realism does not imply theism. If "something wrong because you atheist say it's wrong" then that's just an anti-realist position.
What the Euthyphro is doing here is demonstrating that moral realism does not depend on the existence of God.
“It’s wrong because it’s wrong” sounds like a meaningless statement to me.
The Euthyphro dilemma, or the Euthyphro false dilemma, shows that morality depends on the Christian God, and not on any kind of limited gods, such as those in polytheistic systems like that of the Greeks.
Those were your words. If you think they are meaningless then you've just undermined your own argument that you can apply the Euthyphro dilemma to atheistic reasoning.
WRT you second point, that's a strong claim. Do you have an argument to back that up?
I should have phrased it a little more carefully as “do you approve of it because it’s good? (Then what is the basis of its goodness?) “Or is it good because you approve of it? (Arbitrary.) Either way it shows the difficulty of atheism to sustain moral realism.
Re. Second question: I’m curious. Do you believe that the laws of logic are real? Or subjective?
OK, so I would note I took your "meaningless statement" to have the same meaning as your second attempt.
WRT your second question I think you make a slip "real" is not the opposite of subjective. I think the laws of logic are objective because we agree on their definition. I do not think that the laws of logic have any existence outside the definitions conceptualized and created by human minds. So I'm guessing that does not meet your understanding of "real".
So it sounds like we agree that the euthyphro dilemma poses a problem for any atheist who is also a moral realist.
I’d view logic to be a part of the structure of the universe and it’s based in the character of God. Similarly morality is based in the character of God. So regarding both there are objective truths that humans can be right or wrong about.
I've actually heard several atheists say that the "Euthyphro Dilemma" isn't really a big problem for the Christian at all. Even the atheists realize its flawed😄
"Many traditional forms of theism appeal to or depend upon broader philosophical patterns which we have good criticisms of independently of religion itself.
- Justificationism
- Essentialism
- Manifest truth
- Appeals to infallible authority
- Self-insulation and perpetuation
- Historicism"
One of those is justificationism.
From a counterfactual perspective, an appeal to God's nature as a response to the dilemma naturally leads us to ask: why is God's nature as it is (A) instead of some other nature? (B, C, D, etc.) Apparently, you seem to have decided to stop looking for explanations. But why there, instead of somewhere else?
You could say God's nature is necessary, but we could again ask, why is that nature necessary, as opposed to some other nature? Furthermore, that seems similar to the original divine command horn, by swapping out nature instead of commands.
On the other hand, we could take the path that God nature's is morally good because it's that of a perfect being. But then perfection starts to look like some kind of external standard outside God.
I'd also point out essentialism.
"A good parent will make good rules, and a bad parent will make bad rules."
But this is highly simplistic, as illustrated in the case of unintended consequences.
Moral knowledge, like all other knowledge, genuinely grows. We start with a problem (what to do next), conjecture theories about how the world works to, designed to solve them, then criticize those theories.
IOW, the idea that we shouldn't tell our children to play in traffic is hard-won moral knowledge. Hindsight is 20/20. So, is the idea that we shouldn't keep slaves, etc.
This is also why appeals to “good intentions” or “good nature” are insufficient.
If we take certain theological claims literally, difficult questions emerge.
For example, if young children who die are guaranteed heaven, while adults risk eternal damnation, why would it be wrong to prematurely end a child’s life to guarantee eternal bliss?
One possible answer is: “because the person committing the act would go to hell.” But that only pushes the problem back another level. Someone could still believe their own eternal punishment would be a worthwhile sacrifice in exchange for guaranteeing eternal salvation for many others.
The point is not to endorse such reasoning. Quite the opposite.
It is a reductio showing that sincerity, good intentions, and perceived moral duty are insufficient for moral correctness. People can genuinely believe they are serving the highest good while being catastrophically mistaken because their underlying theories about reality are false.
That is why moral knowledge, like all knowledge, cannot rest on authority, intention, or supposed purity of nature alone. It requires criticism, error correction, and openness to deeper explanation.
We wouldn't have a charge of manslaughter if intention didn't matter.
"This is why we all want our politicians and rulers to be good, because we know that if they’re good, we’ll get good and fair laws. If they’re corrupt, we’ll get laws that are unfair and that hurt most of us for the benefit of a few. The better someone’s character, the better their will."
See above. Again, this seems highly naive. Is the truth manifest? Can we just observe it or derive it mechanically from experience? Was it already present at the outset?
If will was sufficient, we'd already have a cure for cancer by now because the a significant collective will of the medical community wants to cure cancer.
Rulers are only a means to an end. What we actually want are good explanations, good institutions, and good policies, whether they emerge from:
- one ruler,
- many rulers,
- traditions,
- democratic institutions,
- or no rulers at all.
That is why Karl Popper argued “Who should rule?” is the wrong question. What we actually want are traditions that allow us to remove bad leaders and bad policies without violence.
What we want from our ideas is their content, not their providence.
These are not some fringe criticisms. They are well known and independent of Christianity, which would be a special case of those philosophical views. Is there some reason why you haven't included them?
BTW, if you're reading the classics, check out Popper's "The Open Society and Its Enemies" and "Objective Knowledge", which criticizes many of the ideas presented there.
The only real thing you seem to be actually addressing here is my point that a good parent will issue good commands. That our command and will flow naturally from our nature. Are you denying that? Will a perfectly good parent issue bad commands to their children?
The only real thing you seem to be actually addressing here is my point that a good parent will issue good commands.
I’m pointing out a move to avoid the dilemma by appealing to God’s nature reflects essentialism. Namely, the idea that we ought to explain things in terms of ultimate essences or intrinsic natures. This is a philosophical view that has been criticized independently of traditional theism. In that sense, traditional theism is a special case of essentialism, so criticisms of essentialism are relevant here.
You wrote:
“A good parent will make good rules, and a bad parent will make bad rules.”
But where do those good rules come from?
“Don’t play in the street” didn’t originate from the parent. It reflects hard-won moral knowledge accumulated over generations. The parent is standing on the shoulders of giants, so to speak. We propose solutions to problems, criticize them, discard the ones that fail, and retain the ones that survive criticism. The parent adopts ideas that have withstood that process.
That is the growth of moral knowledge.
If a parent encounters a genuinely new and concrete moral problem, are they guaranteed to formulate a good rule? No. Neither are good rulers, legislators, judges, or anyone else.
For example, if we brought a caring Spartan parent into the present, they might think it is good for children to take risks that most modern parents would consider unacceptable. Spartan parents were not trying to harm their children. They believed they were preparing them for life as they understood it. They cared about their children, but many of their moral ideas were mistaken. Much of this comes from the fact that Sparta’s civilization was static. There was some perfect state and deviating from that resulted in a loss and degradation.
IOW, moral progress is not primarily a matter of possessing a good nature. It depends on the creation, criticism, and improvement of knowledge.
You also wrote:
If you had a perfect father, or a perfect ruler, they couldn’t command things that were wrong or bad. Neither can God.
But this seems to replace an explanation with a definition. Again, that’s essentialism.
The word “perfect” appears to be doing all the work. Why are the commands good? Because the ruler is perfect. Why is the ruler perfect? Because they issue good commands.
More importantly, are you denying that the appeal to God’s nature is an appeal to essence? Specifically, are you denying that it reflects the broader philosophical view that things should ultimately be explained in terms of their essential nature?
Because that is the move I’m criticizing, not merely the claim that good parents tend to give good advice.
Your use of the phrase "a maximally good being cannot command evil things" is very telling. Either the standard of goodness is external to this being, and moral realism is therefore possible without God, or it isn't and your "maximally good" is in fact a circular definition and you're just defining God as maximally good as a bare fact (which is an assertion rather than an argument).
You can't actually avoid this dilemma by waving your hand and saying "it's both". It does not cut it.
You’re confused as usual Giles. This isn’t definitional it’s ontological. We don’t say God is good because we just want to define Him that way, God is the good and we understand that (people like me, not you) and then we describe him in this manner. Your total lack of understanding in this matter in now way deals with the solution that’s been around for hundreds of years.
Either an standard of goodness external to God exists or it doesn't.
If it does then moral realism does not require God. If it does not then God is his own standard of goodness and your argument is circular. (Effectively God is good because he is God.)
I get that you feel obliged to take it on faith that God is good but there is no justification for this belief.
No you are confused. God is the ground of all reality, a standard doesn’t exist independently of Him, therefore God’s perfect character is the standard of goodness. Do you have an actual rebuttal to anything I argued in this article or do you just want to keep repeating dead talking points that I’ve already refuted multiple times now?
You haven't refuted any of this. You just keep asserting the same circular definition. You claim God has a perfect character. Where is the standard of perfection for this claim? Everything you say about this is circular. You might as well say moral realism is true because you believe that to be the case. It would at least be more honest.
If your only move is to be a broken record and continue to put forward a refuted argument rather than dealing with anything actually argued in this article, then I’ll rest my case👍
Like many atheist objections, it applies equally as well against atheism…or I should say it applies against atheism and is solved by Christianity. Here’s why, I could say “is something wrong because you atheist say it’s wrong? (Arbitrary) Or do you say it’s wrong because it’s wrong? (So what’s the basis of the standard?)”
I think you're missing something crucial here. If "it's wrong because it's wrong" then that means moral realism does not imply theism. If "something wrong because you atheist say it's wrong" then that's just an anti-realist position.
What the Euthyphro is doing here is demonstrating that moral realism does not depend on the existence of God.
“It’s wrong because it’s wrong” sounds like a meaningless statement to me.
The Euthyphro dilemma, or the Euthyphro false dilemma, shows that morality depends on the Christian God, and not on any kind of limited gods, such as those in polytheistic systems like that of the Greeks.
Those were your words. If you think they are meaningless then you've just undermined your own argument that you can apply the Euthyphro dilemma to atheistic reasoning.
WRT you second point, that's a strong claim. Do you have an argument to back that up?
I should have phrased it a little more carefully as “do you approve of it because it’s good? (Then what is the basis of its goodness?) “Or is it good because you approve of it? (Arbitrary.) Either way it shows the difficulty of atheism to sustain moral realism.
Re. Second question: I’m curious. Do you believe that the laws of logic are real? Or subjective?
OK, so I would note I took your "meaningless statement" to have the same meaning as your second attempt.
WRT your second question I think you make a slip "real" is not the opposite of subjective. I think the laws of logic are objective because we agree on their definition. I do not think that the laws of logic have any existence outside the definitions conceptualized and created by human minds. So I'm guessing that does not meet your understanding of "real".
So it sounds like we agree that the euthyphro dilemma poses a problem for any atheist who is also a moral realist.
I’d view logic to be a part of the structure of the universe and it’s based in the character of God. Similarly morality is based in the character of God. So regarding both there are objective truths that humans can be right or wrong about.
I've actually heard several atheists say that the "Euthyphro Dilemma" isn't really a big problem for the Christian at all. Even the atheists realize its flawed😄
Wouldn’t it be amazing if other atheists finally got the memo? lol
Seriously!
Love your explanations. Thanks for doing what you do ✊
Again and again and again and it keeps coming up as if it is something new
It keeps coming up because there isn’t a satisfactory answer to it. “It’s both” does not cut it.
From a reply on one of your posts on X:
"Many traditional forms of theism appeal to or depend upon broader philosophical patterns which we have good criticisms of independently of religion itself.
- Justificationism
- Essentialism
- Manifest truth
- Appeals to infallible authority
- Self-insulation and perpetuation
- Historicism"
One of those is justificationism.
From a counterfactual perspective, an appeal to God's nature as a response to the dilemma naturally leads us to ask: why is God's nature as it is (A) instead of some other nature? (B, C, D, etc.) Apparently, you seem to have decided to stop looking for explanations. But why there, instead of somewhere else?
You could say God's nature is necessary, but we could again ask, why is that nature necessary, as opposed to some other nature? Furthermore, that seems similar to the original divine command horn, by swapping out nature instead of commands.
On the other hand, we could take the path that God nature's is morally good because it's that of a perfect being. But then perfection starts to look like some kind of external standard outside God.
I'd also point out essentialism.
"A good parent will make good rules, and a bad parent will make bad rules."
But this is highly simplistic, as illustrated in the case of unintended consequences.
Moral knowledge, like all other knowledge, genuinely grows. We start with a problem (what to do next), conjecture theories about how the world works to, designed to solve them, then criticize those theories.
IOW, the idea that we shouldn't tell our children to play in traffic is hard-won moral knowledge. Hindsight is 20/20. So, is the idea that we shouldn't keep slaves, etc.
This is also why appeals to “good intentions” or “good nature” are insufficient.
If we take certain theological claims literally, difficult questions emerge.
For example, if young children who die are guaranteed heaven, while adults risk eternal damnation, why would it be wrong to prematurely end a child’s life to guarantee eternal bliss?
One possible answer is: “because the person committing the act would go to hell.” But that only pushes the problem back another level. Someone could still believe their own eternal punishment would be a worthwhile sacrifice in exchange for guaranteeing eternal salvation for many others.
The point is not to endorse such reasoning. Quite the opposite.
It is a reductio showing that sincerity, good intentions, and perceived moral duty are insufficient for moral correctness. People can genuinely believe they are serving the highest good while being catastrophically mistaken because their underlying theories about reality are false.
That is why moral knowledge, like all knowledge, cannot rest on authority, intention, or supposed purity of nature alone. It requires criticism, error correction, and openness to deeper explanation.
We wouldn't have a charge of manslaughter if intention didn't matter.
"This is why we all want our politicians and rulers to be good, because we know that if they’re good, we’ll get good and fair laws. If they’re corrupt, we’ll get laws that are unfair and that hurt most of us for the benefit of a few. The better someone’s character, the better their will."
See above. Again, this seems highly naive. Is the truth manifest? Can we just observe it or derive it mechanically from experience? Was it already present at the outset?
If will was sufficient, we'd already have a cure for cancer by now because the a significant collective will of the medical community wants to cure cancer.
Rulers are only a means to an end. What we actually want are good explanations, good institutions, and good policies, whether they emerge from:
- one ruler,
- many rulers,
- traditions,
- democratic institutions,
- or no rulers at all.
That is why Karl Popper argued “Who should rule?” is the wrong question. What we actually want are traditions that allow us to remove bad leaders and bad policies without violence.
What we want from our ideas is their content, not their providence.
These are not some fringe criticisms. They are well known and independent of Christianity, which would be a special case of those philosophical views. Is there some reason why you haven't included them?
BTW, if you're reading the classics, check out Popper's "The Open Society and Its Enemies" and "Objective Knowledge", which criticizes many of the ideas presented there.
The only real thing you seem to be actually addressing here is my point that a good parent will issue good commands. That our command and will flow naturally from our nature. Are you denying that? Will a perfectly good parent issue bad commands to their children?
The only real thing you seem to be actually addressing here is my point that a good parent will issue good commands.
I’m pointing out a move to avoid the dilemma by appealing to God’s nature reflects essentialism. Namely, the idea that we ought to explain things in terms of ultimate essences or intrinsic natures. This is a philosophical view that has been criticized independently of traditional theism. In that sense, traditional theism is a special case of essentialism, so criticisms of essentialism are relevant here.
You wrote:
“A good parent will make good rules, and a bad parent will make bad rules.”
But where do those good rules come from?
“Don’t play in the street” didn’t originate from the parent. It reflects hard-won moral knowledge accumulated over generations. The parent is standing on the shoulders of giants, so to speak. We propose solutions to problems, criticize them, discard the ones that fail, and retain the ones that survive criticism. The parent adopts ideas that have withstood that process.
That is the growth of moral knowledge.
If a parent encounters a genuinely new and concrete moral problem, are they guaranteed to formulate a good rule? No. Neither are good rulers, legislators, judges, or anyone else.
For example, if we brought a caring Spartan parent into the present, they might think it is good for children to take risks that most modern parents would consider unacceptable. Spartan parents were not trying to harm their children. They believed they were preparing them for life as they understood it. They cared about their children, but many of their moral ideas were mistaken. Much of this comes from the fact that Sparta’s civilization was static. There was some perfect state and deviating from that resulted in a loss and degradation.
IOW, moral progress is not primarily a matter of possessing a good nature. It depends on the creation, criticism, and improvement of knowledge.
You also wrote:
If you had a perfect father, or a perfect ruler, they couldn’t command things that were wrong or bad. Neither can God.
But this seems to replace an explanation with a definition. Again, that’s essentialism.
The word “perfect” appears to be doing all the work. Why are the commands good? Because the ruler is perfect. Why is the ruler perfect? Because they issue good commands.
More importantly, are you denying that the appeal to God’s nature is an appeal to essence? Specifically, are you denying that it reflects the broader philosophical view that things should ultimately be explained in terms of their essential nature?
Because that is the move I’m criticizing, not merely the claim that good parents tend to give good advice.
“Perfectly good” by what standard?
Your use of the phrase "a maximally good being cannot command evil things" is very telling. Either the standard of goodness is external to this being, and moral realism is therefore possible without God, or it isn't and your "maximally good" is in fact a circular definition and you're just defining God as maximally good as a bare fact (which is an assertion rather than an argument).
You can't actually avoid this dilemma by waving your hand and saying "it's both". It does not cut it.
You’re confused as usual Giles. This isn’t definitional it’s ontological. We don’t say God is good because we just want to define Him that way, God is the good and we understand that (people like me, not you) and then we describe him in this manner. Your total lack of understanding in this matter in now way deals with the solution that’s been around for hundreds of years.
I'm not at all confused.
Either an standard of goodness external to God exists or it doesn't.
If it does then moral realism does not require God. If it does not then God is his own standard of goodness and your argument is circular. (Effectively God is good because he is God.)
I get that you feel obliged to take it on faith that God is good but there is no justification for this belief.
No you are confused. God is the ground of all reality, a standard doesn’t exist independently of Him, therefore God’s perfect character is the standard of goodness. Do you have an actual rebuttal to anything I argued in this article or do you just want to keep repeating dead talking points that I’ve already refuted multiple times now?
You haven't refuted any of this. You just keep asserting the same circular definition. You claim God has a perfect character. Where is the standard of perfection for this claim? Everything you say about this is circular. You might as well say moral realism is true because you believe that to be the case. It would at least be more honest.
If your only move is to be a broken record and continue to put forward a refuted argument rather than dealing with anything actually argued in this article, then I’ll rest my case👍
My move is a broken record because you all you've given in response is ad-homs and diversions.
Either an standard of goodness external to God exists or it doesn't.
If it does then moral realism does not require God.
If it does not then God is his own standard of goodness and your argument is circular.
Is God his own standard of goodness or is there a standard of goodness external to him?
Answer that question and we can make progress.
These points refute your argument.